First Treatise: "Good and Evil," "Good and Bad"

These English psychologists whom we also have to thank for the only attempts so far to produce a history of the genesis of morality—they themselves are no small riddle for us; I confess, in fact, that precisely as riddles in the flesh they have something substantial over their books—they themselves are interesting! These English psychologists—what do they actually want? One finds them, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, always at the same task, namely of pushing the partie honteuse of our inner world into the foreground and of seeking that which is actually effective, leading, decisive for our development, precisely where the intellectual pride of man would least of all wish to find it (for example in the vis inertiae of habit or in forgetfulness or in a blind and accidental interlacing and mechanism of ideas or in anything purely passive, automatic, reflexive, molecular, and fundamentally mindless)—what is it actually that always drives these psychologists in precisely this direction? Is it a secret, malicious, base instinct to belittle mankind, one that perhaps cannot be acknowledged even to itself? Or, say, a pessimistic suspicion, the mistrust of disappointed, gloomy idealists who have become poisonous and green? Or a little subterranean animosity and rancor against Christianity (and Plato) that has perhaps not yet made it past the threshold of consciousness? Or even a lascivious taste for the disconcerting, for the painful-paradoxical, for the questionable and nonsensical aspects of existence? Or finally—a little of everything, a little meanness, a little gloominess, a little anti-Christianity, a little tickle and need for pepper? ... But I am told that they are simply old, cold, boring frogs who creep and hop around on human beings, into human beings, as if they were really in their element there, namely in a swamp. I resist this, still more, I don’t believe it; and if one is permitted to wish where one cannot know, then I wish from my heart that the reverse may be the case with them—that these explorers

*partie honteuse* shameful part (in the plural, this expression is the equivalent of the English “private parts”).

*vis inertiae* force of inactivity. In Newtonian physics, this term denotes the resistance offered by matter to any force tending to alter its state of rest or motion.
and microscopists of the soul are basically brave, magnanimous, and proud animals who know how to keep a rein on their hearts as well as their pain and have trained themselves to sacrifice all desirability to truth, to every truth, even plain, harsh, ugly, unpleasant, unchristian, immoral truth ... For there are such truths.—

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Hats off then to whatever good spirits may be at work in these historians of morality! Unfortunately, however, it is certain that they lack the historical spirit itself, that they have been left in the lurch precisely by all the good spirits of history! As is simply the age-old practice among philosophers, they all think essentially ahistorically; of this there is no doubt. The ineptitude of their moral genealogy is exposed right at the beginning, where it is a matter of determining the origins of the concept and judgment "good." "Originally"—so they decree—"unegoistic actions were praised and called good from the perspective of those to whom they were rendered, hence for whom they were useful; later one forgot this origin of the praise and, simply because unegoistic actions were as a matter of habit always praised as good, one also felt them to be good—as if they were something good in themselves." One sees immediately: this first derivation already contains all the characteristic traits of the idiosyncrasy of English psychologists—we have "usefulness," "forgetting," "habit," and in the end "error," all as basis for a valuation of which the higher human being has until now been proud as if it were some kind of distinctive prerogative of humankind. This pride must be humbled, this valuation devalued: has this been achieved? ... Now in the first place it is obvious to me that the actual genesis of the concept "good" is sought and fixed in the wrong place by this theory: the judgment "good" does not stem from those to whom "goodness" is rendered! Rather it was "the good" themselves, that is the noble, powerful, high-ranking, and high-minded who felt and ranked themselves and their doings as good, which is to say, as of the first rank, in contrast to everything base, low-minded, common, and vulgar. Out of this pathos of distance they first took for themselves the right to create values, to coin names for values: what did they care about usefulness! The viewpoint of utility is as foreign and inappropriate as possible, especially in relation to so hot an outpouring of highest rank-ordering, rank-distinguishing value judgments: for here feeling has arrived at an opposite of that low degree of warmth presupposed by every calculating prudence, every
assessment of utility—and not just for once, for an hour of exception, but rather for the long run. As was stated, the pathos of nobility and distance, this lasting and dominant collective and basic feeling of a higher ruling nature in relation to a lower nature, to a “below”—that is the origin of the opposition “good” and “bad.” (The right of lords to give names goes so far that we should allow ourselves to comprehend the origin of language itself as an expression of power on the part of those who rule: they say “this is such and such,” they seal each thing and happening with a sound and thus, as it were, take possession of it.) It is because of this origin that from the outset the word “good” does not necessarily attach itself to “unegoistic” actions—as is the superstition of those genealogists of morality. On the contrary, only when aristocratic value judgments begin to decline does this entire opposition “egoistic” “unegoistic” impose itself more and more on the human conscience—to make use of my language, it is the herd instinct that finally finds a voice (also words) in this opposition. And even then it takes a long time until this instinct becomes dominant to such an extent that moral valuation in effect gets caught and stuck at that opposition (as is the case in present-day Europe: today the prejudice that takes “moral,” “unegoistic,” “désintéressé” to be concepts of equal value already rules with the force of an “idée fixe” and sickness in the head).

In the second place, however: quite apart from the historical untenability of that hypothesis concerning the origins of the value judgment “good,” it suffers from an inherent psychological absurdity. The usefulness of the unegoistic action is supposed to be the origin of its praise, and this origin is supposed to have been forgotten:—how is this forgetting even possible? Did the usefulness of such actions cease at some point? The opposite is the case: this usefulness has been the everyday experience in all ages, something therefore that was continually underscored anew; accordingly, instead of disappearing from consciousness, instead of becoming forgettable, it could not help but impress itself upon consciousness with ever greater clarity. How much more reasonable is that opposing theory (it is not therefore truer—) advocated for example by Herbert Spencer—which ranks the concept “good” as essentially identi-

désintéresse] disinterested, unselfish, selfless.
“idée fixe”] obsession; literally: a fixed idea.
cal with the concept "useful," "purposive," so that in the judgments "good" and "bad" humanity has summed up and sanctioned its unfor-
ten and unforgettable experiences concerning what is useful-purposive, what is injurious-nonpurposive. Good, according to this theory, is whatever has proved itself as useful from time immemorial: it may thus claim validity as "valuable in the highest degree," as "valuable in itself." This path of explanation is also false, as noted above, but at least the explanation is in itself reasonable and psychologically tenable.

—The pointer to the right path was given to me by the question: what do the terms coined for "good" in the various languages actually mean from an etymological viewpoint? Here I found that they all lead back to the same conceptual transformation—that everywhere the basic concept is "noble," "aristocratic" in the sense related to the estates, out of which "good" in the sense of "noble of soul," "high-natured of soul," "privileged of soul" necessarily develops: a development that always runs parallel to that other one which makes "common," "vulgar," "base" pass over finally into the concept "bad." The most eloquent example of the latter is the German word "schlecht" [bad] itself: which is identical with "schlicht" [plain, simple]—compare "schlechtweg," "schlechterdings" [simply or downright]—and originally designated the plain, the common man, as yet without a suspecting sideward glance, simply in opposition to the noble one. Around the time of the Thirty-Years' War, in other words late enough, this sense shifts into the one now commonly used.—With respect to morality's genealogy this appears to me to be an essential insight; that it is only now being discovered is due to the inhibiting influence that democratic prejudice exercises in the modern world with regard to all questions of origins. And this influence extends all the way into that seemingly most objective realm of natural science and physiology, as I shall merely hint at here. But the nonsense that this prejudice—once unleashed to the point of hate—is able to inflict, especially on morality and history, is shown by Buckle's notorious case; the plebeianism of the modern spirit, which is of English descent, sprang forth there once again on its native ground, vehemently like a muddy volcano and with that oversalted, overloud, common eloquence with which until now all volcanoes have spoken.—
With regard to our problem—which can for good reasons be called a quiet problem and which addresses itself selectively to but few ears—it is of no small interest to discover that often in those words and roots that designate "good" that main nuance still shimmers through with respect to which the nobles felt themselves to be humans of a higher rank. To be sure, they may name themselves in the most frequent cases simply after their superiority in power (as "the powerful," "the lords," "the commanders") or after the most visible distinguishing mark of this superiority, for example as "the rich," "the possessors," (that is the sense of aryə; and likewise in Iranian and Slavic). But also after a typical character trait: and this is the case which concerns us here. They call themselves for example "the truthful"—led by the Greek nobility, whose mouthpiece is the Megarian poet Theognis. The word coined for this, esthlos, means according to its root one who is, who possesses reality, who is real, who is true; then, with a subjective turn, the true one as the truthful one: in this phase of the concept's transformation it becomes the by- and catchword of the nobility and passes over completely into the sense of "aristocratic," as that which distinguishes from the lying common man as Theognis understands and depicts him—until finally, after the demise of the nobility, the word remains as the term for noblesse of soul and becomes as it were ripe and sweet. In the word kakos as well as in deilos (the plebeian in contrast to the agathos) cowardliness is underscored: perhaps this gives a hint in which direction one should seek the etymological origins of agathos, which can be interpreted in many ways. In the Latin malus (beside which I place melas), the common man could be characterized as the dark-colored, above all as the black-haired ("hic niger est—"), as the pre-Aryan occupant of Italian soil, who by his color stood out most clearly from the blonds who had become the rulers, namely the Aryan conqueror-race; at any rate Gaelic offered me an exactly corresponding

arya] Sanskrit: noble.
esthlos] good, brave, noble.
deilos] cowardly, worthless, low-born, miserable, wretched.
agathos] good, well-born, noble, brave, capable.
malus] bad, evil.
melas] black, dark.
hic niger est] he is black. Horace's Satires, I. 4, line 85.
On the Genealogy of Morality

case—fin (for example in the name Fin-Gal), the distinguishing word of the nobility, in the end, the good, noble, pure one, originally the blond-headed one, in contrast to the dark, black-haired original inhabitants. The Celts, incidentally, were by all means a blond race; it is wrong to associate those tracts of an essentially dark-haired population, which are noticeable on the more careful ethnographic maps of Germany, with any Celtic origins or blood mixtures, as even Virchow does: rather it is the pre-Aryan population of Germany that comes to the fore in these places. (The same is true for almost all of Europe: in essence, the subjected race has in the end regained the upper hand there, in color, shortness of skull, perhaps even in intellectual and social instincts—who will guarantee us that modern democracy, the even more modern anarchism, and in particular that inclination toward the "commune," the most primitive form of society—an inclination now common to all of Europe's socialists—does not signify, on the whole, a tremendous atavism—and that the race of lords and conquerors, that of the Aryans, is not in the process of succumbing physiologically as well? ... ) I believe I may interpret the Latin bonus as "the warrior": assuming that I am correct in tracing bonus back to an older duonus (compare bellum = duellum = duen-lum, in which that duonus seems to me to be preserved). Bonus accordingly as man of strife, of division (duo), as man of war—one sees what it was about a man that constituted his "goodness" in ancient Rome. Our German "gut" [good] itself: wasn't it supposed to mean "the godly one," the man "of godly race"? And to be identical with the name for the nation (originally for the nobility) of the Goths? The reasons for this supposition do not belong here.—

To this rule that the concept of superiority in politics always resolves itself into a concept of superiority of soul, it is not immediately an exception (although it provides occasion for exceptions) when the highest caste is at the same time the priestly caste and hence prefers for its collective name a predicate that recalls its priestly function. Here, for example, "pure" and "impure" stand opposite each other for the first time as marks of distinction among the estates; and here, too, one later finds the devel-

bonus] good.
duonus] earlier form of bonus.
bellum ... duen-lum] war; the latter two are older, poetic forms.
opment of a “good” and a “bad” in a sense no longer related to the estates. Incidentally, let one beware from the outset of taking these concepts “pure” and “impure” too seriously, too broadly, or even too symbolically: rather all of earlier humanity’s concepts were initially understood in a coarse, crude, superficial, narrow, straightforward, and above all unsymbolic manner, to an extent that we can hardly imagine. The “pure one” is from the beginning simply a human being who washes himself, who forbids himself certain foods that bring about skin diseases, who doesn’t sleep with the dirty women of the baser people, who abhors blood—nothing more, at least not much more! On the other hand the entire nature of an essentially priestly aristocracy admittedly makes clear why it was precisely here that the valuation opposites could so soon become internalized and heightened in a dangerous manner; and indeed through them gulfs were finally torn open between man and man across which even an Achilles of free-spiritedness will not be able to leap without shuddering. From the beginning there is something unhealthy in such priestly aristocracies and in the habits ruling there, ones turned away from action, partly brooding, partly emotionally explosive, habits that have as a consequence the intestinal disease and neurasthenia that almost unavoidably clings to the priests of all ages; but what they themselves invented as a medicine against this diseasedness of theirs—must we not say that in the end it has proved itself a hundred times more dangerous in its aftereffects than the disease from which it was to redeem them? Humanity itself still suffers from the aftereffects of these priestly cure naïvetés! Think, for example, of certain dietary forms (avoidance of meat), of fasting, of sexual abstinence, of the flight “into the wilderness” (Weir-Mitchellian isolation, admittedly without the ensuing fattening diet and over-feeding, which constitutes the most effective antidote for all the hysteria of the ascetic ideal): in addition, the whole anti-sensual metaphysics of priests, which makes lazy and overrefined, their self-hypnosis after the manner of the fakir and Brahmin—brahma used as glass pendant and idée fixe—and the final, only too understandable general satiety along with its radical cure, nothingness (or God—the longing for a unio mystica with God is the longing of the Buddhist for nothingness, Nirvâna—and nothing more!) With priests everything simply becomes more dangerous, not only curatives and healing arts, but also arrogance, revenge, acuity, excess, love, lust to rule, virtue, disease;—though with some fairness one could also add that it was on the soil of this essentially dangerous form of human existence, the unio mystica] mystical union.
priestly form, that man first became an interesting animal, that only here did the human soul acquire depth in a higher sense and become evil—and these are, after all, the two basic forms of the previous superiority of man over other creatures! ...

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—One will already have guessed how easily the priestly manner of valuation can branch off from the knightly-aristocratic and then develop into its opposite; this process is especially given an impetus every time the priestly caste and the warrior caste confront each other jealously and are unable to agree on a price. The knightly-aristocratic value judgments have as their presupposition a powerful physicality, a blossoming, rich, even overflowing health, together with that which is required for its preservation: war, adventure, the hunt, dance, athletic contests, and in general everything which includes strong, free, cheerful-hearted activity. The priestly-noble manner of valuation—as we have seen—has other presuppositions: too bad for it when it comes to war! Priests are, as is well known, the most evil enemies—why is that? Because they are the most powerless. Out of their powerlessness their hate grows into something enormous and uncanny, into something most spiritual and most poisonous. The truly great haters in the history of the world have always been priests, also the most ingenious haters:—compared with the spirit of priestly revenge all the rest of spirit taken together hardly merits consideration. Human history would be much too stupid an affair without the spirit that has entered into it through the powerless:—let us turn right to the greatest example. Of all that has been done on earth against “the noble,” “the mighty,” “the lords,” “the power-holders,” nothing is worthy of mention in comparison with that which the Jews have done against them: the Jews, that priestly people who in the end were only able to obtain satisfaction from their enemies and conquerors through a radical revaluation of their values, that is, through an act of spiritual revenge. This was the only way that suited a priestly people, the people of the most suppressed priestly desire for revenge. It was the Jews who in opposition to the aristocratic value equation (good = noble = powerful = beautiful = happy = beloved of God) dared its inversion, with fear-inspiring consistency, and held it fast with teeth of the most unfathomable hate (the hate of powerlessness), namely: “the miserable alone are the good; the poor, powerless, lowly alone are the good; the suffering, deprived, sick, ugly are also the only pious, the only blessed in God, for them alone is there blessedness,—
whereas you, you noble and powerful ones, you are in all eternity the evil, the cruel, the lustful, the insatiable, the godless, you will eternally be the wretched, accursed, and damned!” … We know who inherited this Jewish revaluation … In connection with the enormous and immeasurably doom-laden initiative provided by the Jews with this most fundamental of all declarations of war, I call attention to the proposition which I arrived at on another occasion ("Beyond Good and Evil" section 195)—namely, that with the Jews the slave revolt in morality begins: that revolt which has a two-thousand-year history behind it and which has only moved out of our sight today because it—has been victorious …

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—But you don’t understand that? You don’t have eyes for something that has taken two thousand years to achieve victory? … There is nothing to wonder at in this: all lengthy things are difficult to see, to see in their entirety. This however is what happened: out of the trunk of that tree of revenge and hate, Jewish hate—the deepest and most sublime hate, namely an ideal-creating, value-reshaping hate whose like has never before existed on earth—grew forth something just as incomparable, a new love, the deepest and most sublime of all kinds of love:—and from what other trunk could it have grown? … But by no means should one suppose it grew upwards as, say, the true negation of that thirst for revenge, as the opposite of Jewish hate! No, the reverse is the truth! This love grew forth out of it, as its crown, as the triumphant crown unfolding itself broadly and more broadly in purest light and sunny fullness, reaching out, as it were, in the realm of light and of height, for the goals of that hate—for victory, for booty, for seduction—with the same drive with which the roots of that hate sunk themselves ever more thoroughly and greedily down into everything that had depth and was evil. This Jesus of Nazareth, as the embodied Gospel of Love, this “Redeemer” bringing blessedness and victory to the poor, the sick, the sinners—was he not precisely seduction in its most uncanny and irresistible form, the seduction and detour to precisely those Jewish values and reshapings of the ideal? Has not Israel reached the final goal of its sublime desire for revenge precisely via the detour of this “Redeemer,” this apparent adversary and dissolver of Israel? Does it not belong to the secret black art of a truly great politics of revenge, of a far-seeing, subterranean, slow-working and pre-calculating revenge, that Israel itself, before all the world, should deny as its mortal enemy and nail to the cross the actual tool of its revenge, so that
“all the world,” namely all the opponents of Israel, could take precisely this bait without thinking twice? And, out of all sophistication of the spirit, could one think up any more dangerous bait? Something that in its enticing, intoxicating, anesthetizing, destructive power might equal that symbol of the “holy cross,” that gruesome paradox of a “god on the cross,” that mystery of an inconceivable, final, extreme cruelty and self-crucifixion of God for the salvation of man? ... What is certain, at least, is that sub hoc signo Israel, with its revenge and revaluation of all values, has thus far again and again triumphed over all other ideals, over all more noble ideals.— —

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—“But why are you still talking about nobler ideals! Let’s submit to the facts: the people were victorious—or ‘the slaves,’ or ‘the mob,’ or ‘the herd,’ or whatever you like to call them—if this happened through the Jews, so be it! then never has a people had a more world-historic mission. ‘The lords’ are cast off; the morality of the common man has been victorious. One may take this victory to be at the same time a blood poisoning (it mixed the races together)—I won’t contradict; in any event it is beyond doubt that this toxification succeeded. The ‘redemption’ of the human race (namely from ‘the lords’) is well under way; everything is jewifying or christifying or mobifying as we watch (what do the words matter!). The progress of this poisoning through the entire body of humanity appears unstoppable, from now on its tempo and step may even be slower, more refined, less audible, more thoughtful—one has time after all ... Does the church today still have a necessary task in this scheme, still a right to existence at all? Or could one do without it? Quaeritur. It seems more likely that it inhibits and holds back this progress instead of accelerating it? Well, even that could be its usefulness ... By now it is certainly something coarse and peasant-like, which repels a more delicate intelligence, a truly modern taste. Shouldn’t it at least become somewhat refined? ... Today it alienates more than it seduces ... Which of us indeed would be a free spirit if there were no church? The church, not its poison, repels us ... Leaving the church aside, we, too, love the poison ...”—This, the epilogue of a “free spirit” to my speech, an honest animal, as he has richly betrayed, moreover a democrat; he had listened to me up until then and

*sub hoc signo*] under this sign.

*Quaeritur*] one asks, i.e., that is the question.
couldn’t stand to hear me be silent. For at this point I have much to be silent about.—

10

The slave revolt in morality begins when *ressentiment* itself becomes creative and gives birth to values: the *ressentiment* of beings denied the true reaction, that of the deed, who recover their losses only through an imaginary revenge. Whereas all noble morality grows out of a triumphant yes-saying to oneself, from the outset slave morality says “no” to an “outside,” to a “different,” to a “not-self”: and this “no” is its creative deed. This reversal of the value-establishing glance—this necessary direction toward the outside instead of back onto oneself—belongs to the very nature of *ressentiment*: in order to come into being, slave-morality always needs an opposite and external world; it needs, psychologically speaking, external stimuli in order to be able to act at all,—its action is, from the ground up, reaction. The reverse is the case with the noble manner of valuation: it acts and grows spontaneously, it seeks out its opposite only in order to say “yes” to itself still more gratefully and more jubilantly—its negative concept “low” “common” “bad” is only an after-birth, a pale contrast-image in relation to its positive basic concept, saturated through and through with life and passion: “we noble ones, we good ones, we beautiful ones, we happy ones!” When the noble manner of valuation lays a hand on reality and sins against it, this occurs relative to the sphere with which it is not sufficiently acquainted, indeed against a real knowledge of which it rigidly defends itself: in some cases it forms a wrong idea of the sphere it holds in contempt, that of the common man, of the lower people; on the other hand, consider that the affect of contempt, of looking down on, of the superior glance—assuming that it does falsify the image of the one held in contempt—will in any case fall far short of the falsification with which the suppressed hate, the revenge of the powerless, lays a hand on its opponent—in effigy, of course. Indeed there is too much carelessness in contempt, too much taking-lightly, too much looking-away and impatience mixed in, even too much of a feeling of cheer in oneself, for it to be capable of transforming its object into a real caricature and monster. Do not fail to hear the almost benevolent nuances that, for example, the Greek nobility places in all words by which it distinguishes the lower people from itself; how they are mixed with and sugared by a kind of pity, considerateness, leniency to the point that almost all words that apply to the common man ultimately survive as expressions for
"unhappy" "pitiful" (compare deilos, deilaios, poneros, mochtheros, the latter two actually designating the common man as work-slave and beast of burden)—and how, on the other hand, to the Greek ear "bad" "low" "unhappy" have never ceased to end on the same note, with a tone color in which "unhappy" predominates: this as inheritance of the old, nobler aristocratic manner of valuation that does not deny itself even in its contempt (let philologists be reminded of the sense in which oizyros, anolbos, tlemon, dystychein, xymphora are used). The "well-born" simply felt themselves to be the "happy"; they did not first have to construct their happiness artificially by looking at their enemies, to talk themselves into it, to lie themselves into it (as all human beings of ressentiment tend to do); and as full human beings, overloaded with power and therefore necessarily active, they likewise did not know how to separate activity out from happiness,—for them being active is of necessity included in happiness (whence eu prattein takes its origins)—all of this very much in opposition to "happiness" on the level of the powerless, oppressed, those festering with poisonous and hostile feelings, in whom it essentially appears as narcotic, anesthetic, calm, peace, "Sabbath," relaxation of mind and stretching of limbs, in short, passively. While the noble human being lives with himself in confidence and openness (gennaios "noble-born" underscores the nuance "sincere" and probably also "naive") the human being of ressentiment is neither sincere, nor naive, nor honest and frank with himself. His soul looks obliquely at things; his spirit loves hiding places, secret passages and backdoors, everything hidden strikes him as his world, his security, his balm; he knows all about being silent, not forgetting, waiting, belittling oneself for the moment, humbling oneself. A race of such human beings of ressentiment in the end necessarily becomes more prudent than any noble race, it will also honor prudence in an entirely different measure: namely as a primary condition of existence. With noble human beings of

deilos, deilaios, poneros, mochtheros] deilos: cowardly, worthless, low-born, miserable, wretched; deilaios: wretched, sorry, paltry; poneros: wretched, oppressed by toils, worthless, base, cowardly; mochtheros: wretched, suffering hardship, miserable, worthless, knavish.
oizyros, anolbos, tlemon, dystychein, xymphora] oizyros: woeful, pitiable, miserable, sorry, poor; anolbos: unblest, wretched, luckless, poor; tlemon: suffering, enduring; hence: "steadfast, stouthearted," but also "wretched, miserable"; dystychein: to be unlucky, unhappy, unfortunate; xymphora: originally "chance," then usually in a bad sense, that is, "misfortune."
eu prattein] to do well, to fare well, or to do good.
gennaios] high-born, noble, high-minded.
beings, in contrast, prudence is likely to have a refined aftertaste of luxury and sophistication about it:—here it is not nearly as essential as the complete functional reliability of the regulating unconscious instincts or even a certain imprudence, for example the gallant making-straight-for-it, be it toward danger, be it toward the enemy, or that impassioned suddenness of anger, love, reverence, gratitude, and revenge by which noble souls in all ages have recognized each other. For the ressentiment of the noble human being, when it appears in him, runs its course and exhausts itself in an immediate reaction, therefore it does not poison—on the other hand it does not appear at all in countless cases where it is unavoidable in all the weak and powerless. To be unable for any length of time to take his enemies, his accidents, his misdeeds themselves seriously—that is the sign of strong, full natures in which there is an excess of formative, reconstructive, healing power that also makes one forget (a good example of this from the modern world is Mirabeau, who had no memory for insults and base deeds committed against him and who was only unable to forgive because he—forgot). Such a human is simply able to shake off with a single shrug a collection of worms that in others would dig itself in; here alone is also possible—assuming that it is at all possible on earth—the true “love of one’s enemies.” What great reverence for his enemies a noble human being has!—and such reverence is already a bridge to love ... After all, he demands his enemy for himself, as his distinction; he can stand no other enemy than one in whom there is nothing to hold in contempt and a very great deal to honor! On the other hand, imagine “the enemy” as the human being of ressentiment conceives of him—and precisely here is his deed, his creation: he has conceived of “the evil enemy,” “the evil one,” and this indeed as the basic concept, starting from which he now also thinks up, as reaction and counterpart, a “good one”—himself! ... 

Precisely the reverse, therefore, of the case of the noble one, who conceives the basic concept “good” in advance and spontaneously, starting from himself that is, and from there first creates for himself an idea of “bad”! This “bad” of noble origin and that “evil” out of the brewing cauldron of unsatiated hate—the first, an after-creation, something on the side, a complementary color; the second, in contrast, the original, the beginning, the true deed in the conception of a slave morality—how differently the two words “bad” and “evil” stand there, seemingly set in
opposition to the same concept “good”! But it is not the same concept “good”: on the contrary, just ask yourself who is actually “evil” in the sense of the morality of ressentiment. To answer in all strictness: precisely the “good one” of the other morality, precisely the noble, the powerful, the ruling one, only recolored, only reinterpreted, only reseen through the poisonous eye of ressentiment. There is one point we wish to deny least of all here: whoever encounters those “good ones” only as enemies encounters nothing but evil enemies, and the same humans who are kept so strictly within limits inter pares, by mores, worship, custom, gratitude, still more by mutual surveillance, by jealousy, and who on the other hand in their conduct towards each other prove themselves so inventive in consideration, self-control, tact, loyalty, pride, and friendship,—they are not much better than uncaged beasts of prey toward the outside world, where that which is foreign, the foreign world, begins. There they enjoy freedom from all social constraint; in the wilderness they recover the losses incurred through the tension that comes from a long enclosure and fencing-in within the peace of the community; they step back into the innocence of the beast-of-prey conscience, as jubilant monsters, who perhaps walk away from a hideous succession of murder, arson, rape, torture with such high spirits and equanimity that it seems as if they have only played a student prank, convinced that for years to come the poets will again have something to sing and to praise. At the base of all these noble races one cannot fail to recognize the beast of prey, the splendid blond beast who roams about lusting after booty and victory; from time to time this hidden base needs to discharge itself, the animal must get out, must go back into the wilderness: Roman, Arab, Germanic, Japanese nobility, Homeric heroes, Scandinavian Vikings—in this need they are all alike. It is the noble races who have left the concept “barbarian” in all their tracks wherever they have gone; indeed from within their highest culture a consciousness of this betrays itself and even a pride in it (for example when Pericles says to his Athenians in that famous funeral oration, “to every land and sea our boldness has broken a path, everywhere setting up unperishing monuments in good and bad”). This “boldness” of noble races—mad, absurd, sudden in its expression; the unpredictable, in their enterprises even the improbable—Pericles singles out for distinction the rhathy mia of the Athenians—their indifference and contempt toward all security, body, life, comfort; their appalling light-

inter pares] among equals; here, “among themselves.”
heartedness and depth of desire in all destruction, in all the delights of victory and of cruelty—all was summed up for those who suffered from it in the image of the “barbarian,” of the “evil enemy,” for example the “Goth,” the “Vandal.” The deep, icy mistrust that the German stirs up as soon as he comes into power, today once again—is still an atavism of that inextinguishable horror with which Europe has for centuries watched the raging of the blond Germanic beast (although there is hardly a conceptual, much less a blood-relationship between the ancient Teutons and us Germans). I once called attention to Hesiod’s embarrassment as he was devising the succession of the cultural ages and attempted to express it in terms of gold, silver, bronze: he knew of no other way to cope with the contradiction posed by the glorious but likewise so gruesome, so violent world of Homer, than by making one age into two, which he now placed one after the other—first the age of the heroes and demigods of Troy and Thebes, as this world had remained in the memory of the noble dynasties who had their own ancestors there; then the bronze age, which was that same world as it appeared to the descendants of the downtrodden, plundered, mistreated, dragged-off, sold-off: an age of bronze, as stated—hard, cold, cruel, without feeling or conscience, crushing everything and covering it with blood. Assuming it were true, that which is now in any case believed as “truth,” that the meaning of all culture is simply to breed a tame and civilized animal, a domestic animal, out of the beast of prey “man,” then one would have to regard all those instincts of reaction and ressentiment, with the help of which the noble dynasties together with their ideals were finally brought to ruin and overwhelmed, as the actual tools of culture; which is admittedly not to say that the bearers of these instincts themselves at the same time also represent culture. On the contrary, the opposite would not simply be probable—no! today it is obvious! These bearers of the oppressing and retaliation-craving instincts, the descendants of all European and non-European slavery, of all pre-Aryan population in particular—they represent the regression of humankind! These “tools of culture” are a disgrace to humanity, and rather something that raises a suspicion, a counter-argument against “culture” in general! It may be entirely justifiable if one cannot escape one’s fear of the blond beast at the base of all noble races and is on guard: but who would not a hundred times sooner fear if he might at the same time admire, than not fear but be unable to escape the disgusting sight of the deformed, reduced, atrophied, poisoned? And is that not our doom? What causes our aversion to “man”?—for we suffer from man, there is no doubt. —Not fear; rather that we have
nothing left to fear in man; that the worm "man" is in the foreground and teeming; that the "tame man," this hopelessly mediocre and uninspiring being, has already learned to feel himself as the goal and pinnacle, as the meaning of history, as "higher man"—indeed that he has a certain right to feel this way, insofar as he feels himself distanced from the profusion of the deformed, sickly, tired, worn—out of which Europe today is beginning to stink; hence as something that is at least relatively well-formed, at least still capable of living, that at least says "yes" to life …

—At this point I will not suppress a sigh and a final confidence. What is it that I in particular find utterly unbearable? That with which I cannot cope alone, that causes me to suffocate and languish? Bad air! Bad air! That something deformed comes near me; that I should have to smell the entrails of a deformed soul! … How much can one not otherwise bear of distress, deprivation, foul weather, infirmity, drudgery, isolation?Basically one deals with everything else, born as one is to a subterranean and fighting existence; again and again one reaches the light, again and again one experiences one's golden hour of victory,—and then one stands there as one was born, unbreakable, tensed, ready for something new, something still more difficult, more distant, like a bow that any distress simply pulls tauter still. —But from time to time grant me—assuming that there are heavenly patronesses beyond good and evil—a glimpse, grant me just one glimpse of something perfect, completely formed, happy, powerful, triumphant, in which there is still something to fear! Of a human being who justifies man himself; a human being who is a stroke of luck, completing and redeeming man, and for whose sake one may hold fast to belief in man! … For things stand thus: the reduction and equalization of the European human conceals our greatest danger, for this sight makes tired … We see today nothing that wishes to become greater, we sense that things are still going downhill, downhill—into something thinner, more good-natured, more prudent, more comfortable, more mediocre, more apathetic, more Chinese, more Christian—man, there is no doubt, is becoming ever "better" … Precisely here lies Europe's doom—with the fear of man we have also forfeited the love of him, the reverence toward him, the hope for him, indeed the will to him. The sight of man now makes tired—what is nihilism today if it is not that? … We are tired of man …
—But let us come back: the problem of the other origin of “good,” of the good one as conceived by the man of ressentiment, demands its conclusion. —That the lambs feel anger toward the great birds of prey does not strike us as odd: but that is no reason for holding it against the great birds of prey that they snatch up little lambs for themselves. And when the lambs say among themselves “these birds of prey are evil; and whoever is as little as possible a bird of prey but rather its opposite, a lamb,—isn’t he good?” there is nothing to criticize in this setting up of an ideal, even if the birds of prey should look on this a little mockingly and perhaps say to themselves: “we do not feel any anger towards them, these good lambs, as a matter of fact, we love them: nothing is more tasty than a tender lamb.”—

To demand of strength that it not express itself as strength, that it not be a desire to overwhelm, a desire to cast down, a desire to become lord, a thirst for enemies and resistances and triumphs, is just as nonsensical as to demand of weakness that it express itself as strength. A quantum of power is just such a quantum of drive, will, effect—more precisely, it is nothing other than this very driving, willing, effecting, and only through the seduction of language (and the basic errors of reason petrified therein), which understands and misunderstands all effecting as conditioned by an effecting something, by a “subject,” can it appear otherwise. For just as common people separate the lightning from its flash and take the latter as a doing, as an effect of a subject called lightning, so popular morality also separates strength from the expressions of strength as if there were behind the strong an indifferent substratum that is free to express strength—or not to. But there is no such substratum; there is no “being” behind the doing, effecting, becoming; “the doer” is simply fabricated into the doing—the doing is everything. Common people basically double the doing when they have the lightning flash; this is a doing-doing: the same happening is posited first as cause and then once again as its effect. Natural scientists do no better when they say “force moves, force causes,” and so on—our entire science, despite all its coolness, its freedom from affect, still stands under the seduction of language and has not gotten rid of the changelings slipped over on it, the “subjects” (the atom, for example, is such a changeling, likewise the Kantian “thing in itself”): small wonder if the suppressed, hiddenly glowing affects of revenge and hate exploit this belief and basically even uphold no other belief more ardently than this one, that the strong one is free to be weak, and the bird of prey to be a lamb:—they thereby gain for themselves the right to hold the bird of prey
accountable for being a bird of prey ... When out of the vengeful cunning of powerlessness the oppressed, downtrodden, violated say to themselves: "let us be different from the evil ones, namely good! And good is what everyone is who does not do violence, who injures no one, who doesn't attack, who doesn't retaliate, who leaves vengeance to God, who keeps himself concealed, as we do, who avoids all evil, and in general demands very little of life, like us, the patient, humble, righteous"—it means, when listened to coldly and without prejudice, actually nothing more than: "we weak ones are simply weak; it is good if we do nothing for which we are not strong enough"—but this harsh matter of fact, this prudence of the lowest order, which even insects have (presumably playing dead when in great danger in order not to do "too much"), has, thanks to that counterfeiting and self-deception of powerlessness, clothed itself in the pomp of renouncing, quiet, patiently waiting virtue, as if the very weakness of the weak—that is to say, his essence, his effecting, his whole unique, unavoidable, undetachable reality—were a voluntary achievement, something willed, something chosen, a deed, a merit. This kind of human needs the belief in a neutral "subject" with free choice, out of an instinct of self-preservation, self-affirmation, in which every lie tends to hallow itself. It is perhaps for this reason that the subject (or, to speak more popularly, the soul) has until now been the best article of faith on earth, because it made possible for the majority of mortals, the weak and oppressed of every kind, that sublime self-deception of interpreting weakness itself as freedom, of interpreting their being-such-and-such as a merit.

Would anyone like to go down and take a little look into the secret of how they fabricate ideals on earth? Who has the courage to do so? ... Well then! The view into these dark workplaces is unobstructed here. Wait just a moment, Mr. Wanton—Curiosity and Daredevil: your eyes must first get used to this falsely shimmering light ... So! Enough! Now speak! What's going on down there? Tell me what you see, man of the most dangerous curiosity—now I am the one listening.—

"I don't see anything, but I hear all the more. There is a cautious malicious quiet whispering and muttering—together out of all corners and nooks. It seems to me that they are lying; a sugary mildness sticks to each sound. Weakness is to be lied into a merit, there is no doubt about it—it is just as you said."

—Go on!
and the powerlessness that does not retaliate into kindness; fearful baseness into 'humility'; subjection to those whom one hates into 'obedience' (namely to one whom they say orders this subjection—they call him God). The inoffensiveness of the weak one, cowardice itself, which he possesses in abundance, his standing–at-the-door, his unavoidable having–to-wait, acquires good names here, such as 'patience,' it is even called virtue itself; not being able to avenge oneself is called not wanting to avenge oneself, perhaps even forgiveness ('for they know not what they do—we alone know what they do!'). They also talk of 'love of one's enemies'—and sweat while doing so."

—Go on!

"They are miserable, there is no doubt, all of these whisperers and nook–and–cranny counterfeiters, even if they are crouching together warmly—but they tell me that their misery is a distinction and election from God, that one beats the dogs one loves the most; perhaps this misery is also a preparation, a test, a schooling, perhaps it is still more—something for which there will one day be retribution, paid out with enormous interest in gold, no! in happiness. This they call 'blessedness'."

—Go on!

"Now they are giving me to understand that they are not only better than the powerful, the lords of the earth, whose saliva they must lick (not out of fear, not at all out of fear! but rather because God commands that they honor all authority)—that they are not only better, but that they are also 'better off,' at least will be better off one day. But enough! enough! I can't stand it anymore. Bad air! Bad air! This workplace where they fabricate ideas—it seems to me it stinks of sheer lies."

—No! A moment more! You haven't said anything about the masterpiece of these artists of black magic who produce white, milk, and innocence out of every black:—haven't you noticed what the height of their sophistication is, their boldest, finest, most ingenious, most mendacious artistic stroke? Pay attention! These cellar animals full of revenge and hate—what is it they make precisely out of this revenge and hate? Did you ever hear these words? Would you guess, if you trusted their words alone, that those around you are all humans of resentment? ...

"I understand, I'll open my ears once again (oh! oh! oh! and close my nose). Now for the first time I hear what they have said so often: 'We good ones—we are the just'—what they demand they call not retaliation but rather 'the triumph of justice'; what they hate is not their enemy, no! they hate 'injustice,' 'ungodliness'; what they believe and hope for is not the hope for revenge, the drunkenness of sweet revenge (—already Homer
called it ‘sweeter than honey’), but rather the victory of God, of the just
God over the ungodly; what is left on earth for them to love are not their
brothers in hate but rather their ‘brothers in love,’ as they say, all the good
and just on earth.”

—And what do they call that which serves them as comfort against all
the sufferings of life—their phantasmagoria of the anticipated future
blessedness?

—“What? Did I hear right? They call that ‘the last judgment,’ the
coming of their kingdom, of the ‘kingdom of God’—meanwhile, however,
they live ‘in faith,’ ‘in love,’ ‘in hope.’”

—Enough! Enough!

In faith in what? In love of what? In hope of what? —These weak ones—
someday they too want to be the strong ones, there is no doubt, someday
their “kingdom” too shall come—among them it is called “the kingdom of
God” pure and simple, as was noted: they are of course so humble in all
things! Even to experience that they need to live long, beyond death—
indeed they need eternal life so that in the ‘kingdom of God’ they can also
recover eternally the losses incurred during that earth-life “in faith, in love,
in hope.” Recover their losses for what? Recover their losses through what?

... It was a gross blunder on Dante’s part, it seems to me, when, with ter-
ror-instilling ingenuousness, he placed over the gate to his hell the inscrip-
tion “I, too, was created by eternal love”:—in any case, over the gate of the
Christian paradise and its “eternal blessedness” there would be better ju-
stification for allowing the inscription to stand “I, too, was created by eternal
hate”—assuming that a truth may stand above the gate to a lie! For what is
the blessedness of that paradise? ... We would perhaps guess it already; but
it is better that it is expressly documented for us by an authority not to be
underestimated in such matters, Thomas Aquinas, the great teacher and
saint. “Beati in regno coelestia,” he says meekly as a lamb, “videbunt poenas
damnatorum, ut beatitudo illis magis complaceat.” Or would you like to
hear it in a stronger key, for instance from the mouth of a triumphant
church father who counseled his Christians against the cruel pleasures of
the public spectacles—and why? “Faith offers us much more,”—he says,

*Beati in ... magis complaceat*] “The blessed in the kingdom of heaven will see the
punishments of the damned, in order that their bliss be more delightful to them.”

*Summa Theologica III Supplementum Q. 94, Art. 1.*
De spectac. c. 29 ss.—"something much stronger; thanks to salvation there are entirely different joys at our disposal; in place of the athletes we have our martyrs; if we desire blood, well, we have the blood of Christ ... But what awaits us above all on the day of his return, of his triumph!"—and now he continues, the enraptured visionary: "At enim supersunt alia spectacula, ille ultimus et perpetuus judicii dies, ille nationibus insperatus, ille derisus, cum tanta saeculi vetustas et tot ejus nativitates uno igne haurientur. Quae tunc spectaculi latitudo! Quid admirer! Quid rideam! Ubi gaudeam! Ubi exultem, spectans tot et tantos reges, qui in coelum recepti nuntiabantur, cum ipso Jove et ipsis suis testibus in imis tenebris congemescens! Item praesides (the provincial governor) persecutores dominici nominis saevioribus quam ipsi flammis saevierunt insulitantibus contra Christianos liquescentes! Quos praeterea sapientes illos philosophos coram discipulis suis una conflagrantibus erubescentes, quibus nihil ad deum pertinere suadebant, quibus animas aut nullas aut non in pristina corpora redituras affirmabant! Etiam poetàs non ad Rhadamanti nec ad Minois, sed ad inopinati Christi tribunal palpitantes! Tunc magis tragoedi audiendi, magis silicet vocales (in better voice, even more awful screamers) in sua propria calamitate; tunc histriones cognoscendi, solutiores multo per ignem; tunc spectandum auriga inflammea rota totus rubens, tunc xyistic contemplandi non in gymnasiis, sed in igne jaculati, nisi quod ne tunc quidem illos velim vivos, ut qui malim ad eos potius conspectum insatiabilem conferre, qui in dominum desaevierunt. 'Hic est ille, dicam, fabri aut quaestuariae filius (as everything that follows shows, and in particular this well-known designation from the Talmud for the mother of Jesus, from here on Tertullian means the Jews), sabbati destructor, Samarites et daemonium habens. Hic est, quem a Juda redemistis, hic est ille arundine et colaphis diverberatus, sputamentis dedecoratus, felle et aceto potatus. Hic est, quem clam discentes subripuerunt, ut resurrexisse dicatur vel hortulanus detraxit, ne lactucae suae frequentia commeantum laederentur. Ut talia spectes, ut talibus exultes, quis tibi praetor aut consul aut quaestor aut sacerdos de sua liberalitate præstabat? Et tamen haec jam habemus quodammodo per fidem spiritu imaginante repraesentata. Ceterum qualia illa sunt, quae nec oculus vidit nec auris audivit nec in cor hominis ascenderunt? (1 Cor. 2:9) Credo circa et utraque cavea (first and fourth tiers, or, according to others, comic and tragic stages) et omni stadio gratiora."—Per fidem: thus it is written.

"At enim supersunt ... omni stadio gratiora." ["But indeed there are still other sights, that last and eternal day of judgment, that day unlooked for by the nations, that day they laughed at, when the world so great with age and all its generations shall be consumed by one fire. What variety of sights then! What should I admire! What Per fidem] by [my] faith.
Let us conclude. The two opposed values 'good and bad,' 'good and evil,' have fought a terrible millennia-long battle on earth; and as certainly as the second value has had the upper hand for a long time, even so there is still no shortage of places where the battle goes on, undecided. One could even say that it has in the meantime been borne up ever higher and precisely thereby become ever deeper, ever more spiritual: so that today there is perhaps no more decisive mark of the “higher nature,” of the more

should I laugh at! In which should I feel joy! In which should I exult, seeing so many and great kings who were reported to have been received into heaven, now groaning in deepest darkness with Jove himself and those who testified of their reception into heaven! Likewise the praesides (the provincial governor), persecutors of the name of the Lord, being liquefied by flames fiercer than those with which they themselves raged against the Christians! What wise men besides, those very philosophers reddening before their disciples as they blaze together, the disciples to whom they suggested that nothing was of any concern to God; to whom they asserted that our souls are either nothing or they will not return to their former bodies! And also the poets, trembling before the judgment seat, not of Rhadamanthys or Minos but of the Christ, whom they did not expect! Then the great tragedians will be heard, in great voice, no doubt (in better voice, even more awful screamers), in their own calamities; then the actors will be recognized, made a great deal more limber by the fire; then the charioteer will be seen, all red on a flaming wheel; then the athletes will be observed, not in their gymnasiums but cast in the fire—were it not for the fact that not even then would I wish to see them since I would much rather bestow my insatiable gaze on those who raged against the Lord. ‘This is he,’ I shall say, ‘the son of the carpenter or the prostitute (as everything that follows shows, and in particular also this well-known designation from the Talmud for the mother of Jesus, from here on Tertullian means the Jews), the Sabbath-breaker, the Samaritan, the one possessed of a devil. This is he whom you bought from Judas, this is the one struck by reed and fist, defiled by spit, given gall and vinegar to drink. This is he whom the disciples secretly stole away that it might be said he had risen, or perhaps the gardener dragged him away so that his lettuce would not be damaged by the crowd of those coming and going.’ That you may see such things, that you may exult in such things—what praetor or consul or quaestor or priest will, out of his generosity, see to this? And yet even now we have them in a way, by faith, represented through the imagining spirit. On the other hand, what are those things which eye hath not seen nor ear heard, nor have ever entered into the heart of man? (1 Cor. 2: 9) I believe they are more pleasing than circus and both theaters (first and fourth tiers, or, according to others, comic and tragic stages) and any stadium.”
First Treatise: “Good and Evil,” “Good and Bad” 31

spiritual nature, than to be conflicted in that sense and still a real battleground for those opposites. The symbol of this battle, written in a script that has so far remained legible across all of human history, is “Rome against Judea, Judea against Rome”:—so far there has been no greater event than this battle, this formulation of the problem, this mortally hostile contradiction. Rome sensed in the Jew something like anti-nature itself, its antipodal monstrosity as it were; in Rome the Jew was held to have been “convicted of hatred against the entire human race”: rightly so, insofar as one has a right to tie the salvation and the future of the human race to the unconditional rule of aristocratic values, of Roman values. What the Jews on the other hand felt towards Rome? One can guess it from a thousand indications; but it will suffice to recall again the Johannine Apocalypse, that most immoderate of all written outbursts that revenge has on its conscience. (Do not under estimate, by the way, the profound consistency of the Christian instinct when it gave precisely this book of hate the name of the disciple of love, the same one to whom it attributed that enamored-rapturous gospel—: therein lies a piece of truth, however much literary counterfeiting may have been needed for this purpose.) The Romans were after all the strong and noble ones, such that none stronger and nobler have ever existed, ever even been dreamt of; everything that remains of them, every inscription thrills, supposing that one can guess what is doing the writing there. The Jews, conversely, were that priestly people of resentment par excellence, in whom there dwelt a popular-moral genius without parallel: just compare the peoples with related talents—for instance the Chinese or the Germans—with the Jews in order to feel what is first and what fifth rank. Which of them has been victorious in the meantime, Rome or Judea? But there is no doubt at all: just consider before whom one bows today in Rome itself as before the quintessence of all the highest values—and not only in Rome, but over almost half the earth, everywhere that man has become tame or wants to become tame,—before three Jews, as everyone knows, and one Jewess (before Jesus of Nazareth, the fisher Peter, the carpet-weaver Paul, and the mother of the aforementioned Jesus, called Mary). This is very remarkable: Rome has succumbed without any doubt. To be sure, in the Renaissance there was a brilliant-uncanny reawakening of the classical ideal, of the noble manner of valuing all things: Rome itself moved like one awakened from apparent death, under the pressure of the new Judaized Rome built above it, which presented the appearance of an ecumenical synagogue and was called “church”: but immediately Judea triumphed again, thanks to that thoroughly mobbish (German and English) resentment movement called
the Reformation, and that which had to follow from it, the restoration of the church—also the restoration of the old sepulchral sleep of classical Rome. In an even more decisive and more profound sense than before, Judea once again achieved a victory over the classical ideal with the French Revolution: the last political nobleness there was in Europe, that of the seventeenth and eighteenth French centuries, collapsed under the instincts of popular ressentiment—never on earth has a greater jubilation, a noisier enthusiasm been heard! It is true that in the midst of all this the most enormous, most unexpected thing occurred: the classical ideal itself stepped bodily and with unheard of splendor before the eyes and conscience of humanity—and once again, more strongly, more simply, more penetratingly than ever, the terrible and thrilling counter-slogan “the privilege of the few” resounded in the face of the old lie-slogan of ressentiment, “the privilege of the majority,” in the face of the will to lowering, to debasement, to leveling, to the downward and evening-ward of man! Like a last sign pointing to the other path, Napoleon appeared, that most individual and late-born human being there ever was, and in him the incar­ nate problem of the noble ideal in itself—consider well, what kind of problem it is: Napoleon, this synthesis of an inhuman and a superhuman ...

—Was that the end of it? Was that greatest of all conflicts of ideals thus placed ad acta for all time? Or just postponed, postponed for a long time? ... Won’t there have to be a still much more terrible, much more thoroughly prepared flaming up of the old fire someday? Still more: wouldn’t precisely this be something to desire with all our might? even to will? even to promote? ... Whoever starts at this point, like my readers, to ponder, to think further, will hardly come to an end any time soon—reason enough for me to come to an end myself, assuming that it has long since become sufficiently clear what I want, what I want precisely with that dangerous slogan that is so perfectly tailored to my last book: “Beyond Good and Evil”... At the very least this does not mean “Beyond Good and Bad.”—

Note. I take advantage of the opportunity that this treatise gives me to express publicly and formally a wish that until now I have expressed only in occasional conversations with scholars: namely

ad acta] shelved, filed away; literally: to the documents.
that some philosophical faculty might do a great service for the pro-
motion of moral-historical studies through a series of academic essay
contests:—perhaps this book will serve to give a forceful impetus in
just such a direction. With respect to a possibility of this sort let me
suggest the following question: it merits the attention of philolo-
gists and historians as much as that of those who are actual scholars
of philosophy by profession.

"What clues does the study of language, in particular etymo-
logical research, provide for the history of the development of
moral concepts?"

—On the other hand it is admittedly just as necessary to win the
participation of physiologists and physicians for these problems (of
the value of previous estimations of value): it may be left to the pro-
fessional philosophers to act as advocates and mediators in this
individual case as well, after they have succeeded in reshaping in
general the relationship between philosophy, physiology, and medi-
cine—originally so standoffish, so mistrustful—into the friendliest
and most fruit-bearing exchange. Indeed every value table, every
"thou shalt," of which history or ethnological research is aware,
needs physiological illumination and interpretation first of all, in any
case before the psychological; all of them likewise await a critique
on the part of medical science. The question: what is the value of
this or that value table or "morality"? demands to be raised from
the most diverse perspectives; for this "value relative to what end?"
cannot be analyzed too finely. Something, for example, that clearly
had value with regard to the greatest possible longevity of a race (or
to a heightening of its powers of adaptation to a specific climate, or
to the preservation of the greatest number), would by no means
have the same value if it were an issue of developing a stronger type.
The welfare of the majority and the welfare of the few are opposing
value viewpoints: to hold the former one to be of higher value
already in itself, this we will leave to the naïveté of English biologists
... All sciences are henceforth to do preparatory work for the phi-
losopher's task of the future: understanding this task such that the
philosopher is to solve the problem of value, that he is to determine
the order of rank among values.
First Treatise

9:1 These English psychologists] It has been suggested that this phrase refers to the British philosophers of the utilitarian-associationist school, perhaps especially Hume, Hartley, Hutcheson, Bentham, and Mill (David S. Thatcher "Zur Genealogie der Moral: Some Textual Annotations," in Nietzsche-Studien 18 [1989] 588). N had gathered considerable information about these thinkers from Lecky’s History of European Morals (1869), a book he mentions in a postcard to his publisher (March 19, 1881), on what seems to be a list of books ordered, and for which he later had considerable praise. “English psychologists” is something of a misnomer, however, and not simply, as Thatcher points out, because Hume was Scottish rather than English. That N explicitly classifies Hume as “English“ in BGE 252 already suggests that he was not using this term in the most literal sense. The only thinker specifically associated with an “English” account of morality in GM is actually not even British, but German: Paul Rée, Nietzsche’s friend and intellectual companion while he was writing Human, All Too Human (1878). This book, sometimes called the beginning of N’s “positivistic” period, was his first, and often very crude, attempt to understand human beings and their activities in completely naturalistic terms (see the Introduction to this translation). The specific “English” proposal regarding morality that Nietzsche criticizes in GM I: 3 is actually closer to the view he himself offered in HA (especially in HA 39 and 92) than it is to any offered by a British philosopher discussed by Lecky. On the other hand, Daybreak (1881) does suggest an account of the origin of morality that is very close to the summary Lecky gives of the view of the utilitarian-associationists (D 104). It differs from the one N criticizes in GM because it is missing the element of ‘forgetting.’ These considerations suggest that Nietzsche uses the phrase “English psychologists” largely to call to mind earlier attempts, including his own, to explain morality in naturalistic terms. He begins his genealogy of morality by referring to his own “ancestors.” Since Hume is probably the greatest of these, his naturalistic account of morality is the obvious standard against which to judge Nietzsche’s claim to have made a significant advance over his predecessors.

10:20 “usefulness,”] Although Nietzsche is discussing utilitarianism here, he does not use the term Utilität—here or elsewhere—though it had been introduced into German by this time. Both the Germanic Nützlichkeit (usefulness) and the Latinate Utilität are used in translations of the works of the utilitarians; the former is used in the translation of Mill’s Utilitarianism found in N’s personal library, Das Nützlichkeitsprincip (Leipzig, 1869). Because Nützlichkeit is an everyday word, we have often translated it as “usefulness.” We have translated the same word as “utility” where doing so seemed important to bring out the connection between N’s argument and utilitarianism.

10:31–32 pathos of distance] The feeling of distance N refers to here is discussed further in BGE 257. The latter passage suggests that the ultimate importance of this pathos to N lies in what he thinks it made possible: “that other, more
mysterious pathos ... the craving for an ever new widening of distances within the soul itself, the development of ever higher, rarer, further, wider-spanning, more comprehensive states—in brief, the enhancement of the type 'man,' the continual 'self-overcoming of man,' to take a moral formula in a sense that goes beyond morality (in einem übermoralischen Sinne).” Cf. BGE 213.

10:37 every calculating prudence] jede berechnende Klugheit. This is the first occurrence in GM of Klugheit (prudence), the noun form of klug (prudent or shrewd; see note 3:12). N’s use of it here with the adjective “calculating” helps to bring out the intended meaning of “prudence” throughout this translation: a calculating rationality, the use of reason merely to find means to ends that are already given, rather than to reflect on the ends themselves. See note 80:1.

11:34 Herbert Spencer] (1820–1903), English sociologist and philosopher. An early advocate of evolutionary theory, he is the father of Social Darwinism: Spencer (and not Darwin) was the one who coined the phrase “survival of the fittest” and claimed that the fittest survive; he also defended an extreme form of economic and social laissez-faire. Spencer had already developed a somewhat Lamarckian theory of evolution before Darwin published the Origin of Species; after its publication, Spencer accepted Darwin’s theory of natural selection but continued to insist that Lamarckian modifications play a role in evolution. His originality lies in his attempt to develop a systematic philosophy based on evolutionary theory. Using theories and results from the various branches of science, he tried to show that everything in the universe exemplifies the same evolutionary development from a simple state where only elementary functions are present to a more complex state characterized by more complicated functions. His major work, The Synthetic Philosophy, completed in 1896, traced the operation of this evolutionary principle through the various sciences; it included volumes on biology, psychology, sociology, and ethics. This work makes him a good example of those N criticizes in GM III:24 for supposing that philosophy can be placed “on a strictly scientific foundation” (110:9ff). Spencer’s ethics is, however, the focus of N’s interest in him. N first mentions Spencer in correspondence from 1879, and in the spring of 1880 he read the German translation of Spencer’s Data of Ethics (now Part I of Vol. 1 of The Principles of Ethics; the quotations below are all taken from chapter three of this work). Unlike the “English psychologists,” Spencer understands morality as a product of evolution, but, like them, his orientation is utilitarian. In Data of Ethics, he discusses “what good and bad mean,” arguing that we obviously call inanimate things “good” or “bad” not on the basis of “intrinsic characters,” but “according as they are well or ill suited to serve prescribed ends,” ends prescribed, that is, by human desires, for “apart from human wants, such things have neither merits nor demerits.” Likewise, when we pass from inanimate things to living ones; we still find that “these words in their current application refer to efficient subservience.” The goodness or badness of other animals, Spencer assumes, is determined completely by their “fitness” for serving “the ends men use them for.” Human conduct is really no different: actions are good or bad,
right or wrong, depending on whether they “do or do not further the general end of self-preservation.” This is not to deny that “goodness, standing by itself, suggests above all other things, the conduct of one who aids the sick in reacquiring normal functioning, assists the unfortunate to recover the means of maintaining themselves, defends those who are threatened with harm in person, property, or reputation, and aids in whatever promises to improve the living of all his fellows.” But this shows only that “acts are called good or bad, according as they are well or ill adjusted to ends.” Any apparent inconsistency with previous claims arises from an inconsistency in the ends. But here evolutionary theory comes in to resolve the problem, for, as Spencer claims to show in the remainder of this book, “the conduct to which we apply the name good, is the relatively more evolved conduct, and ... bad is the name we apply to conduct that is relatively less evolved.” That is, since evolution “tending ever towards self-preservation, reaches its limits where individual life is greatest, both in length and breadth ... evolution becomes the highest possible when the conduct simultaneously achieves the greatest totality of life in self, in offspring, and in fellow men; so here we see that the conduct called good rises to the conduct called best when it fulfills all three classes of ends at the same time.” The only assumption in “these judgments on conduct,” claims Spencer, is that life is worth living, and those who argue either side of this question—optimists and pessimists alike—assume that “life is good or bad, depending on whether it does, or does not, bring a surplus of agreeable feeling.” Thus, “no school can avoid taking for the ultimate moral aim a desirable state of feeling by whatever name—gratification, enjoyment, happiness.” GS 4 and 12 are two of the many passages that show how fundamentally N’s views differ from Spencer’s.

12:13 in the sense related to the estates] The German here is the adverb ständisch, that is, “relating to the estates” (Stände) that existed in various forms at least up until the French Revolution: these were the basic divisions—usually three—of society; the first two were the aristocracy and the clergy, the third was once the peasant or farmer, later the burgher or bourgeois, with the peasantry now outside any estate. The term “fourth estate” could refer to any group other than these three that exercised significant power within the state—in recent times it has come to refer exclusively to the press. One could translate this as “in the class sense,” but we have chosen here to use this less familiar but more literal translation to preserve the “genealogy” of N’s position—he is not discussing groups of society with reference to classes in the sense popularized by Marx—that of dialectically opposed, competing interest groups—but rather with reference to earlier notions of classes or “estates” as the naturally existing component parts of a whole.

12:31 Buckle’s notorious case] Henry Thomas Buckle (1821–1862), English historian, the first one versed in the British empiricist tradition to offer a comprehensive and detailed theory of historical development. He became famous—and, indeed, notorious—through his one and only work, History of Civilization in England. Holding in contempt the history of his day, which emphasized politics,
war, and heroes, he aimed to make history scientific by discovering the fixed laws that govern the actions of men and therefore of societies. On the basis of large-scale surveys concerning the number of marriages, murders and suicides in particular towns and countries during successive years, he argued that human actions are subject to regularities as strict and mathematically exact as those discovered in other branches of scientific inquiry. The relative uniformity of the results of such surveys would be unintelligible, he argued, unless there are social laws capable of keeping the level constant. Because he did not always recognize the difference between causal laws and statistical frequencies, however, he seemed to be claiming something that certainly did not follow from his premises: that the mere existence of a proportional average holding over a period of time necessitated with an irresistible force the commission of a certain number of crimes in a particular year. The resulting picture of human beings as helpless victims of laws over which they have no control is what N takes to reflect the "plebeianism of the modern spirit"; the only possibly attractive feature of this picture is that at least everyone is equal before these laws, for no one has power (cf. BGE 22). The willingness to accept this picture of human beings is also a good example of what N refers to (at 52:6) as learning to live with the "mechanistic senselessness of all happening." When Buckle came to the details of the development of civilization, he actually said little about precise numerical regularities. The "laws" he spoke of turned out to be broad and sometimes very doubtful generalizations concerning the factors that determine the development of societies. Buckle believed that the degree of civilization attained by a society depended on the amount and distribution of its wealth, which depended on the size of its population, which was determined in turn by its food source. The ideal conditions for the development of civilization, he claimed, were found in Europe: the food supply was not so abundant as to lead to overpopulation and its problems, nor so scanty as to make leisure or the intellectual development dependent on it impossible. A number of other factors about the physical conditions ensured that Europeans were less likely to treat nature as an object of awe and veneration, hence to see it instead as something that obeyed regular laws and was therefore capable of being tamed and utilized for human purposes. Although he claimed that the development of civilization in Europe was therefore determined by "the laws of the human mind," he never said what these laws were, but claimed only that the advance and diffusion of knowledge, in particular, of science, was the main factor that gave the development of Europe its overall direction. Morality, in contrast, had little to do with this development, since it had changed little over thousands of years and therefore could not be responsible for the far-reaching transformations of European society. This is undoubtedly the "nonsense inflicted on history and morality" that N refers to in this passage. In a letter of May 20, 1887, N writes that he has just seen Buckle's "much renowned book" and discovered that he is "one of [his] strongest antagonists," adding that "it is hardly believable, how much E. Dühring has made himself dependent on the crude value judgments of this democrat in historical things." See 48:26 and related notes on Dühring.
12:34–35  *volcanoes*] In a letter of May 5, 1873, N applies this metaphor for heated and vehement writing to his own book on David Strauss (UO I), which was a polemic against the idealistic historians of his day. His critique of volcanoes in the present passage presumably applies to his own earlier self, therefore, but it also leaves open the possibility of a polemical style, say that of GM itself, that is not “oversalted, overloud, [or] common.”

13:13  *Megarian poet Theognis*] (late 6th–early 5th century BC), Greek elegiac poet from Megara. At the close of his education at Pforta, N wrote a valedictory essay on Theognis. In a connected piece, he gives the following description of him: “Theognis appears as a finely formed nobleman who has fallen on bad times, with the passions of a nobleman such as his time loved, full of fatal hatred toward the upward-striving masses, tossed about by a sad fate that wore him down and made him milder in many respects. He is a characteristic image of that old, ingenious, somewhat spoiled and no longer firmly rooted blood nobility, placed at the boundary between an old and a new era, a distorted Janus-head, since what is past seems so beautiful and enviable, that which is coming—something that basically has an equal entitlement—seems disgusting and repulsive, a typical head for all of those noble figures who represent the aristocracy prior to a popular revolution that forever threatens their privileges and that moves them to fight and struggle for the existence of the class of nobles with the same passion as for their individual existence” (translated from a quotation given in the biography of Nietzsche by Curt Paul Janz, vol. I, page 124). N’s first publication—while still a student at Leipzig—was an article on the textual transmission of Theognis’ maxims: “Zur Geschichte der Theognideischen Spruchsammlung” (“On the History of the Collection of the Theognidean Anthology,” 1867).

13:26  *hic niger est*] he is black. The quotation is from Horace’s *Satires*, I. 4, line 85: “He that backbites an absent friend, ... and cannot keep secrets, is black, O Roman, beware!”

14:7  *Virchow*] Rudolf Virchow (1821–1902), physician, professor of medicine, and liberal politician. Virchow was one of the most prominent physicians of the 19th century and did pioneering work in the field of cellular pathology—establishing the position that disease arises on the cellular level of the organism and not in the organs or tissues per se. Through his work in the analysis of skull formation he also became involved in the field of anthropology and in 1869 founded the Berlin Society for Anthropology, Ethnology, and Prehistory, of which he was president until his death. He was also editor of the society’s journal, *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie*. Alongside his scientific activities Virchow was also politically active and was involved in numerous public health projects in Berlin. He was co-founder of the German Progressive Party, a member of the *Reichstag* (parliament), and one of Bismarck’s most outspoken opponents.

As Thatcher has pointed out, as early as 1867–1868 N had works by Virchow on his list of books to read. Thatcher’s suggestion that N’s reference in GM is to an article that appeared in Virchow’s *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie*—“Der Spreewald
und die Lausitz,” XII (1880), p. 228—is unfounded; the article does refer to Celtic and Germanic traces, but it is simply a discussion of artifacts found in graves and makes no mention of hair or skin color. Virchow’s article “Die Urbevölkerung Europas” (No. 193 in Series IX of the Sammlung gemeinverständlicher wissenschaftlicher Vorträge, Berlin: Lüderitz, 1874, 1–48) does contain a discussion such as the one N refers to, but it does not support N’s claim. Virchow here clearly groups the Celts among the Aryan peoples characterized by “white skin color, light color of hair and eyes, namely blond or reddish (and at the same time straight or curly) hair and blue eyes, long and narrow (dolichephale) skulls with receding jaw structure, tall and robust bodies” in opposition to the pre-Aryan populations, whom Virchow calls “Turani ans,” and who are characterized by “a darker, more brownish or yellowish skin color, brown or black (frizzly) hair, and dark eyes, short and broad (brachycephale) skulls with protruding jaw, delicate, short, and weaker body build.” “The depictions that have been handed down to us from antiquity of the Celtic, Germanic, and in part of the Slavic peoples fit the first case, the depictions of the Iberians, the Lapps, and the Estonians fit the second case” (29–30).

14:13 “commune,”] Although N is criticizing a general tendency here, he is also alluding to a particular example. In March of 1871, after the French capitulation to Germany in the Franco-Prussian War, nationalist resistance to the premature peace with Germany and republican resistance to monarchist tendencies in the National Assembly led to a revolt of the National Guard against the regular government troops. Elections organized by the central committee of the Parisian National Guard led to the formation of the “Commune,” a city parliament consisting of 85 members. The Commune’s activities (worker protection, cancellation of rent debts, free schooling) tended in the direction of a socialist republic. The Commune was unable to organize an effective political and military leadership, however, and was soon defeated in the brutal fighting that ensued when regular government troops reentered the city in late May.

14:19 duonus] An earlier form of bonus, related to bellum (war), and duellum, an earlier, poetic form of the word bellum. The standard work on Latin etymology, Alois Walde’s Lateinisches etymologisches Wörterbuch, indicates that the particular etymology N proposed here is untenable. The sense of “division” found in the word “duel” did not develop until the late Middle Ages.

15:26 Weir-Mitchellian isolation] Silas Weir Mitchell (1829–1914), was a socially prominent Philadelphian physician and novelist who specialized in treating “nervous” disorders. He became widely known in America and Europe for his “rest cure” for such illnesses: patients were first isolated from the influence of hovering, over-careful family members and restricted to bed for four to six weeks, during which they were not allowed to have visitors or to read or write. They were fed by a nurse and given massages to keep up strength and muscle tone. When they began to show improvement, patients were ordered to get up and take exercise. Mitchell first made his rest cure public in the American Journal of Medical Science
in July of 1873. The treatment quickly gained popularity—both at home and abroad: while Mitchell was visiting the spas at Baden-Baden in 1888, the Grand Duchess of Baden invited him to an audience and told him that two of her cousins had taken the cure. Freud also mentions the cure in *Studies in Hysteria* (1895). Mitchell was also well known for his novels and stories, which often dealt with characters suffering from nervous disorders.

15:31 *brahma*] “The basic idea of the Vedanta—most briefly expressed in the Vedic words: *tat tvam asī, this is what you are* … and *aham brahma asmi, ‘I am brahma’—is the identity of *brahma and the soul*, which is to say that *brahma*, i.e. the eternal principle of all being, the force that creates all worlds, sustains them, and then takes them back into itself, is identical with *ātman*, the self or the soul, i.e., that in us which, if we truly know, we recognize as our actual self, as our inner and true being. This soul of each one of us is not a part, an effluence of brahma, but rather completely and entirely the eternal, indivisible brahma itself.” From: “Brief Overview of the Teaching of the Vedanta” at the end of Paul Deussen’s *System des Vedânta* (see note 78:29 in the third treatise).

15:31 *glass pendant*] The German here is *gläserner Knopf* (*glass* or *glassy knob or button*); what is intended is presumably the sort of bright, shiny object used to hypnotize. Kaufmann’s “glass knob” might fit that description, but Diethe’s and Smith’s “crystal ball” (likewise the French translation of Heim, Hildenbrand, and Gratien—*boule de cristal*—and the Italian of Masini—ifera di cristallo) is misleading; this is not something that enables one to see the future but rather something that makes one oblivious to all else. Cf. the third section of the second treatise in GM on hypnotizing and “idées fixes.” Cf. also *Gay Science* 364.


18:8 *sub hoc signo*] under this sign. This is a reference to the famous motto that Emperor Constantine is supposed to have seen written on a cross that he saw in a vision. In Greek the motto read simply: “by this, conquer”; in Latin it was rendered as “*in hoc signo vinces,*” “under this sign I conquer.” According to the legend, Constantine carried a cross into battle against Maxentius in the year 312 and saw his victory as a fulfillment of the vision. He consequently converted to Christianity.

19:3 *ressentiment*] This French term has stronger associations with revenge than the corresponding English term “resentment.” In earlier books, N had used the German term *Rache* (revenge) for the same concept. See, for instance, “On the Tarantulas” in Z II:7: “*that man be delivered from revenge, that is for me the bridge to the highest hope.*” He evidently started using *ressentiment* for the same idea due to his reading of Dühring (see esp. note 49:18). Compare what N says in this passage about the role of *ressentiment* to BGE 219, in which moral judgments and condemnations are said to offer opportunities for revenge, but also for “acquiring spirit and becoming refined:—malice spiritualized.”

monarchy, Mirabeau was an important figure in the National Assembly that governed France in the early phases of the French Revolution. He was gifted at Machiavellian manipulations of the various parties.


22:9 inter pares] among equals; here: ‘among themselves.’

22:14 foreign, the foreign world] The German here is "das Fremde, die Fremde," literally: "that which is foreign, the foreign." According to its form, the second term would normally designate the quality of "foreignness," but in actual usage it means all of the world outside of the place one comes from, something like the place English-speaking persons go when they go “abroad.”

22:32-33 to every land ... good and bad] Thucydides 2. 41. The meaning of this passage from Thucydides is not undisputed. In a note in the French edition of GM, Maurice de Gandillac gives a sampling of interpretations from various translations of the text: “unperishing monuments of our chastisements and our kindnesses,” (his own suggestion); “to all we have done that is beautiful and good,” Herwerden (1877); “remembrances of evils and of goods,” (Mme de Romilly): “of defeats inflicted on our enemies and of our victories,” (Jean Voilquin); “of our enterprises, of our failures as well as our successes.” (Denis Roussel, Pléiade edition).

23:11 gold, silver, bronze] Hesiod’s account of the five ages is found in Works and Days, lines 107–201. For the account of the Bronze age and the unnamed age that followed it see lines 144–173. N also cites this passage in Daybreak 189.

24: 4 “higher man”] Of BGE’s many references to “higher men,” the most important is probably BGE 256’s discussion of the artists (including Richard Wagner) who taught the nineteenth century, “and it is the century of the crowd!—the concept 'higher man.'” The fourth part of Thus Spoke Zarathustra is the story of dealings between N’s character Zarathustra and the “higher men.”


27:13–14 nook-and-cranny ... crouching together warmly] The wording of this passage suggests that N has drawn on early Christian or pagan sources for this critique—or at any rate that he was familiar with them. In Contra Celsum, the Christian apologist Origen (ca. 185–254 AD) quotes a passage from Celsus’ critique (ca. 185 AD) of the Christian sect, which R. Joseph Hoffmann translates as follows: “The cult of Christ is a secret society whose members huddle together in corners for fear of being brought to trial and punishment.” This is quoted from a reconstruction and translation of Celsus’ work, On the True Doctrine (New York/ Oxford: Oxford UP, 1987).


28:3 brothers in love,’] cf. 1 Thessalonians 3: 12.
28:10 'in faith,' 'in love,' 'in hope.'] cf. 1 Thessalonians 1: 3; also 1 Corinthians 13: 13.

28:21 [ingenuosity] the German here is *Ingenuität*, which at first glance would seem to be "ingenuity" (as Kaufmann and Smith have translated it). It actually means "ingenuousness," "innocence," or "naturalness."

28:22 ["I, too, was created by eternal love"] Divine Comedy, Inferno III, 5–6. The passage actually reads: "Fecemi la divina potestate / La somma sapienza e il primo amore." (I was created by divine power, the highest wisdom, and the first love.)

28:28 [Thomas Aquinas] (1225–1274), Christian theologian and philosopher, canonized by Pope John XXII in 1323 and declared a Doctor of the Church by Pope Pius V in 1567. He was born at Roccasecca in southern Italy. An early branch of his noble family held the county of Aquino until 1137, and it is from there that he got his name. In 1239, Thomas likely entered the house of general studies established by Frederick II in Naples, and there first encountered the works of Aristotle, which were then being rediscovered and translated from Arabic and Greek. Prior to this time, Neoplatonism, especially under the influence of St. Augustine, had had the greatest philosophical influence on Christian theology. After joining the Dominican Order, Thomas was sent to Paris, where he studied under Albertus Magnus from 1245 to 1252. During his more than twenty years as an active teacher, Thomas was a major force in the introduction of Aristotelian themes into Christian theology. Despite strong resistance to Aristotle's natural philosophy, manifested through early prohibitions against the public readings of his works and condemnations in 1277 of certain usages (including Aquinas's) of his philosophy, he had gained a strong position in the courses of university theology. Aquinas's synthesis of the traditional Christian teachings and Aristotle's philosophy was once again given prominence by Pope Leo XIII in 1882 and remained a dominant guide for Catholic thought until recently. Among his most important works are the *Summa Theologica* and the *Summa Contra Gentiles*. (Stephen F. Brown contributed this note.)

28:32 [church father] Tertullian (ca. 155—after 220), important early Christian theologian, polemicist, and moralist from Carthage in North Africa. In Carthage he received an education in literature, philosophy, and law and then went to Rome to complete his education. He became interested in the Christian movement while in Rome but did not convert to Christianity until he returned to Carthage near the end of the century. He produced a large number of works on a variety of topics and was instrumental in developing ecclesiastical Latin. Late in life he became dissatisfied with the laxity of contemporary Christians and left the orthodox church to join the Montanist movement. Even they were not rigorous enough for him and he eventually broke with them and founded his own sect.

28:33—29:4 [Faith offers us ... of his triumph!] This first part of the passage from Tertullian's *De Spectaculis* is a paraphrase, at times bordering on quotation, from chapter 29 and the first sentence of chapter 30. Nietzsche then quotes the
entirety of chapter 30—minus the first four sentences—in Latin. N wrote to Overbeck July 17, 1887 asking him for the passage “in which this beautiful soul depicts in advance the joys that he will enjoy in the “beyond” at the sight of the suffering of his enemies and the anti-Christian minded: the sufferings are specialized in a very ironic and malicious manner, alluding to the former occupations of these enemies. Can you remember the passage? and perhaps send it to me? (original or translated: I need it in German).”

29:17 in better voice ... screamers] N’s gloss of the phrase “magis scilicet vocales” simply offers two possible interpretations of “in great voice, no doubt”: either “with better voices” or “screaming more horribly than ever.”

29:19 vivos] Nietzsche mistakenly has vivos (alive) where the text should read visos (seen). The passage as N has it thus reads “not even then would I wish them alive ...” instead of the original “not even then would I wish to see them ...”

29:22 designation from the Talmud] the passage N refers to here is from the Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 106a, commentary on Joshua 13:22 (Balaam also the son of Beor, the soothsayer): “A soothsayer? But he was a prophet!—R. Johanan said: At first he was a prophet, but subsequently a soothsayer. R. Papa observed: This is what men say, ‘She who was the descendant of princes and governors, played the harlot with carpenters.’” In the annotations to this passage the editors note “that Balaam is frequently used in the Talmud as a type for Jesus ... Though no name is mentioned to show which woman is meant, the mother of Jesus may be alluded to, which theory is strengthened by the statement that she mated with a carpenter.” The Babylonian Talmud, Seder Nezikin in Four Volumes. III: Sanhedrin. Translated by Jacob Shachter and H. Freedman. London: Soncino Press, 1935. Page 725.

29:34 Per fidem] by faith (as bold-faced in the preceding quotation); here: ‘by [my] faith.’ A pun on “perfidy” is also possible here.

31:8 “convicted ... human race”] Tacitus, Annales, XV, 44. The phrase quoted here actually refers to Christians rather than Jews—Tacitus writes that Nero blamed cases of arson on Christians as scapegoats, but that they “were convicted, not so much on the count of arson as for hatred of the human race.” One editor notes that “Jewish ‘misanthropy’—which was proverbial—may have suggested the charge” (Tacitus, The Annals, ed. John Jackson. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1937: 284–85.) In Histories V, 5, Tacitus writes that “the Jews are extremely loyal toward one another and always ready to show compassion, but towards every other people they feel only hate and enmity.” (Histories, Books IV–V, Trans!. by Clifford H. Moore. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1931.)

32:19 inhuman and a superhuman] The German here is “Unmensch” (inhuman one, monster) and “Übermensch” (superhuman one).

32:29 perfectly tailored to] The German expression here is “auf den Leib geschrieben,” literally, “written to the body” or “onto the body.” The idiom presumably comes from theater language, where it meant to write something
specifically for a particular actor, and has come to mean “be tailored to,” “fit perfectly.” Nietzsche plays here with the literal meaning as well, however, since the title is also “written onto the body” of his book.

32:32  Note This note was not included in the manuscript as N sent it to the publisher. N mentions it to Heinrich Köselitz (Peter Gast) in a letter dated August 30, 1887: “I hope nothing disruptive has occurred at Naumann [N’s publisher]: we still aren’t any further since sheet 3. I did however insert a note (for scholars) on the blank page at the end of the first treatise.”

33:32  English biologists] e.g., Herbert Spencer. See note 11:34.